CRITIQUE OF PRAMĀṆA AND SAṀŚAYA (DOUBT) IN VAIDALYASŪTRA OF NĀGĀRJUNA

Abstract

My contention here is mainly text-based exposition of Nāgārjuna’s arguments against Gautama’s Nyāyasūtra in the context of pramāṇa and saṁśaya (doubt). Apart from occasional reply from the Nyāya position no elaborate discussion is included in this presentation. Before entering into the textual details let us put the gist of the arguments of Nāgārjuna. He raises the objection that as claimed by the Nyāya philosopher, there is no necessary tie that exists between the truth of any cognitive position and how do we arrive at it. There lies an epistemic gap between our available causal evidence and asserted content. Nāgārjuna is critical about any kind of cognitive claim for certitude. He also questions the veracity of the law of excluded middle. He tries to show the patent incompleteness and inconsistency in the very assumption of the Nyāya philosopher. If pramāṇa-s are admitted as self-established and prameya-s are by pramāṇa-s, then this argument is nothing but an exercise of dogmatism (dṛṣṭivāda). It will be a case of assumption of putting it in privileged and sacrosanct class without sufficient logical ground. If pramāṇas are not prameya-dependent, then let prameya be not dependent on pramāṇas. If pramāṇas do not require premeya, then pramāṇas are pramāṇas of what? Let both be admitted as inter-dependent on this ground.